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  • nature 5 note 234
    Note 234 This constituted a main theme of the concluding paper of my academic study of philosophy at the University of Amsterdam Metafysica en Natuurwetenschap 1988 Back to main text

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/nature_5_note_234.html (2016-02-01)
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  • nature 5 note 235
    is the Separate Forms We just said substantial form still refers to matter while just form doesn t do so anymore But form already is the quod quid erat esse essence Also the forma totius substantial form non designated matter can be viewed as the quod quid erat esse and also this forma totius doesn t need to mention anyhing extrinsic in its definition If the World only contains material

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/nature_5_note_235.html (2016-02-01)
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  • nature 5 note 236
    Note 236 The complete set of significata is that for which the term nature stands It is the total of significabilia Back to main text

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/nature_5_note_236.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 1 note 2
    concepts that signify only some aspect of the thing If we now want to determine the extension of such a concept we collect all existent entities that are or contain that which is signified by this concept And then we say that although this concept does not signify individual things as individual things it nevertheless stands for these individuals We have here to do with a difference between signification and

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_1_note_2.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 1 note 3
    e d i c a t i o n because Socrates as Socrates just happens to be a human being but the concept human being a given species s i g n i f i e s per se and

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_1_note_3.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 1 note 5
    belongs to that what it is the proprium of except when the causal path leading from the genotypic cause to the phenotypic proprium is very long because then the proprium can be replaced or erased while the Essence of the being remains the same So apart from this exception the term standing for a proprium is essential and connotative Or said better If a term signifies essentially but connotatively that is signifying some essence by connoting a phenotypic effect of it it can be predicated per se but still only in quale of a subject that is it belongs to the Predicable proprium On the other hand if a term signifies non essentially and connotatively 3 it can also be predicated in quale but now only per accidens that is it belongs to the Predicable accidens to which not only terms such as white can belong but also for example the term capable of laughing if we want to emphasize the long causal way leading from the genotypic cause to this property which can as a result of this long causal way be erased or replaced while the Essence of the being carrying this property nevertheless remains the same that

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_1_note_5.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 1 note 6
    of Porphyry relates species genera supergenera etc For instance where the tree is drawn upside down This tree is a part of the total tree representing the Category of Substance

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_1_note_6.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 1 note 7
    we mean The term animal refers to each thing as referring to an individual or undivided nature as does the term man to certain of those same things that is the term man refers to a subset of the set

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_1_note_7.html (2016-02-01)
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