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  • logic 2 note 25
    as a really existing sequence of words Socrates has humanity is an instumental sign the words must first be read or heard it is not so clear how it is with the corresponding mental state that is implicitly evoked while the corresponding extramental fact is explicitly realized when the words are read or heard Intentional Logic maintains that this mental state if indeed it appears in the form of Socrates has humanity and not in the form of Socrates is human embodies a real relation that is somehow structurally similar to the corresponding real relation as it is in extramental reality How could this be Of course we don t know Maybe it has to do with conscious or unconscious imagination which as such is a mental model or picture of the corresponding extramental relation If this is correct then we indeed have to do with the presence of a real relation in the mind And this real relation image is then just an instrumental sign pointing to the extramental relation which is more or less similar And if this were the only way to point to that extramental relation we would never have a means of verifying whether this

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_2_note_25.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 26
    Essence of an ontologically comlete thing though it can intend any formal content such as a quality The essence of an ontologically complete thing or being is gradually apprehended as a result of many sensory experiences But once this is

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_26.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 27
    The intention of mathematical Logic is to go around such a direct assessment of a property and it does so by trying not to explicitly mention this property before coming up with a class of relevant individuals So by not mentioning 7cm we are left with length of this rose that is the property embodied by the class is length of this rose The class was formed by choosing objects whose longest axis that is their length was the same as that of the rose that is objects that are length similar or length identical to this rose which can be determined not necessarily by measuring the rose s length and measuring the length of all the other objects which procedure should be avoided but just by lining up the objects in such a way that their longest axes lie parallel to each other In this way indeed we did not have to measure the rose as to its length and thus explicitly mention 7cm In the same way we can find out that two sets of objects are such that the number of objects contained in the one set is the same as that in the other without counting

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_27.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 28
    this attribution by equating the predicate term sad with the subject term Cassio which proposition is a member of the set of all possible implicit predications predicating the term sad of some possible subject term which together constitute or develops the concept sad to the members of this set also belongs the predication of the term sad of the most general subject term this but for full characterization and constitution

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_28.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 30
    the real entities to which the terms Cassio and sad refer It is only the terms together with their designation that are identified So the relation as expressed by Cassio is sad cannot be a real relation but only a being of reason Indeed this non real relation Cassio is sad intends the real relation Cassio has sadness Cassio possesses the form sadness Here Cassio r e a l l

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_30.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 32
    we suppose that the term impredicable is impredicable the following If we suppose this very concept which we have of so called impredicable concepts to be itself one of these

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_32.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 33
    we can say impredicable is impredicable we cannot say the term or concept of impredicable is itself impredicable Second alternative While we can say impredicable is impredicable we also can say the term or concept of impredicable is itself impredicable About these alternatives If we can legitimately say the term or concept of impredicable is impredicable then it must be predicable If on the other hand we can legitimately say

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_33.html (2016-02-01)
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  • logic 3 note 34
    brain as hardware is the ultimate endpoint of all the rules and metarules in the sense of all the logical languages and metalanguages where we may assume that the languages are discrete with respect to one another that is any

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/nature/logic_3_note_34.html (2016-02-01)
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