archive-nl.com » NL » M » METAFYSICA.NL

Total: 972

Choose link from "Titles, links and description words view":

Or switch to "Titles and links view".
  • note1
    the building blocks of organisms The formation of these atomic building blocks themselves i e the formation of the several atomic species does not need to be included in the history of the formation of the organism because these atomic species i e those species that are going to make up the organism once formed do not change specific identity anymore their individuals of course can and will be replaced

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/a_life_note1.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive


  • note 1
    of Darius arm still attached to his body that it satisfies 2 of Definition 8 X does not involve inherence It could still be a concrete part of a Substance including the Accidents of that part and by consequence not

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/mereo_note1.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive

  • note 2
    dependence is specific in all other cases it is generic Of course every Accident inheres in an individual carrier like the one in our example Socrates tanned But being tanned

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/mereo_note2.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive

  • note 3
    that to the category of essential determinations not only belong the necessarily persistent and completely specified determinations but also necessary successive sequences of determinations but only insofar as they are

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/mereo_note3.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Medieval Sourcebook: Aquinas: Ente et Essentia
    proceed or not Understood in this way body will be the genus of animal for there will be understood in animal nothing that is not implicitly contained in body Now the soul is a form through which there can be designated in the thing three dimensions and therefore when we say that body is what has a form from which three dimensions can be designated in the body we understand there is some kind of form of this type whether soul or lapideousness or whatever other form And thus the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body just as body is its genus The relation of animal to man is the same For if animal named just a certain thing that has a perfection such that it can sense and move by a principle existing in itself without any other perfection then whatever further perfection may supervene would be related to animal as a component part and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal and in this way animal would not be a genus But animal is a genus in that it signifies a certain thing from the form of which sensation and motion can proceed whatever this form may be whether a sensible soul only or a soul both sensible and rational Therefore the genus signifies indeterminately the whole that is in the species and does not signify matter alone Similarly the difference also signifies the whole and does not signify the form alone and the definition or even the species signifies the whole But these nevertheless signify the same thing in different ways For the genus signifies the whole as a certain denomination determining that which is material in the thing without a determination of its proper form whence the genus is taken from the matter although it is not the matter This is clear in the case of bodies as we call something a body in that the thing has a perfection such that in the thing three dimensions can be designated and this perfection is related materially to some further perfection Conversely the difference is like a certain denomination taken from the determined form beyond the first conception of the form by which the matter is determined So when we say something is animated that in other words it has a soul this does not determine what the thing is whether it is a body or some other thing Hence Avicenna says Metaphysicae V cap 6 that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence but only as a being beyond its essence even as a subject is with respect to the concept of a passion And thus the genus is not predicated per se of the difference as the Philosopher says in III Metaphysicae cap 8 998b24 and in IV Topicorum cap 2 122b22 26 unless perhaps as a subject is predicated of a passion But the definition or the species comprehends both namely the determined matter that the term genus designates and the determined form that the term difference designates From this is it clear why the genus the difference and the species are related proportionally to the matter the form and the composite in nature although they are not the same as these things For the genus is not the matter though it is taken from the matter as signifying the whole nor is the difference the form though it is taken from the form as signifying the whole Thus we say that man is a rational animal but not composed of the animal and the rational in the sense that we say that man is composed of soul and body man is said to be composed of soul and body as from two things from which a third thing is constituted different from each of the two Man surely is neither body nor soul But if man is said in some sense to be composed of the animal and the rational it will not be as a third thing composed from these two things but as a third concept composed from these two concepts The concept of animal is without determination of a special form and expresses with respect to the ultimate perfection the nature of the thing from that which is material the concept of the difference rational consists in the determination of the special form From these two concepts are constituted the concept of the species or the definition Thus just as a thing constituted from other things does not have predicated of it these other things so too a concept does not have predicated of it the concepts of which it is constituted clearly we do not say that the definition is either the genus or the difference Although the genus may signify the whole essence of the species nevertheless there is not just one essence of the various species under one genus for the unity of the genus proceeds from its very indetermination or undifferentiation Nor is it the case that what is signified through the genus is numerically one nature in the various species such that to it there supervenes some other thing which is the difference that determines it as a form determines matter which is numerically one Rather the genus signifies some form though not determinately this one or that one which the difference expresses determinately the very one that is signified indeterminately through the genus And thus the Commentator says in Metaphysicae XII 4 com 14 that prime matter is called one by the removal of all forms but the genus is called one through the commonality of forms signified Hence the indetermination which was the cause of the unity of the genus having been removed through the addition of the difference the species remain essentially diverse Furthermore since as said above the nature of the species is indeterminate with respect to the individual just as the nature of the genus is with respect to the species and since further the genus as predicated of the species includes in its signification although indistinctly everything that is in the species determinately so too does the species as predicated of the individual signify everything that is in the individual essentially although it signifies this indistinctly In this way the essence of the species is signified by the term man and so man is predicated of Socrates If however the nature of the species is signified in such a way as to exclude designate matter which is the principle of individuation then the species is related to the individual as a part and this is how the term humanity signifies for humanity signifies that by which a man is a man Designate matter however is not that by which a man is a man and it is in no way contained among those things that make a man a man Since therefore the concept of humanity includes only those things by which a man is a man designate matter is excluded or pretermitted and since a part is not predicated of its whole humanity is predicated neither of man nor of Socrates Thus Avicenna says Metaphysicae V cap 5 that the quiddity of a composite thing is not the composite thing of which it is the quiddity even though the quiddity itself is composite as humanity while composite is not man On the contrary it must be received in something that is designate matter But since as said above the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the form and the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter the term signifying that from which the nature of the genus is taken thus excludes the determinate form that completes the species and signifies the material part of the whole as the body is the material part of the man However the term signifying that from which the nature of the species is taken excluding designate matter signifies the formal part Thus humanity is signified as a certain form and it is said that it is the form of the whole not certainly as a form superadded to the essential parts the form and the matter but rather as the form of a house is superadded to its integral parts and that is better called the form which is the whole in other words that which embraces the form and the matter albeit excluding those things through which the designatability of matter arises Therefore the term man and the term humanity both signify the essence of man though in diverse ways as said above The term man signifies the essence as a whole in other words insofar as the essence does not exclude designation of matter but implicitly and indistinctly contains it in the way in which we said that the genus contains the difference Hence the term man is predicated of individuals But the term humanity signifies the essence of man as a part because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man insofar as he is man and it excludes all designation and so it is not predicated of individual men And for this reason the term essence is sometimes found predicated of the thing as when we say that Socrates is a certain essence and sometimes the term essence is denied of the thing as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates Chapter III Having seen what the term essence signifies in composite substances we ought next see in what way essence is related to the logical intentions of genus species and difference Since that to which the intentions of genus or species or difference is appropriate is predicated of this signate singular it is impossible that a universal intention like that of the species or genus should be appropriate to the essence if the genus or species is signified as a part as in the term humanity or animality Thus Avicenna says Metaphysicae V cap 6 that rationality is not the difference but the principle of the difference For the same reason humanity is not a species and animality is not a genus Similarly we cannot say that the intention of species or genus is appropriate to the essence as to a certain thing existing beyond singulars as the Platonists used to suppose for then the species and the genus would not be predicated of an individual we surely cannot say that Socrates is something that is separated from him nor would that separate thing advance our knowledge of this singular thing And so the only remaining possibility is that the intention of genus or species is appropriate to the essence as the essence is signified as a whole as the term man or animal implicitly and indistinctly contains the whole that is in the individual The nature however or the essence thus understood can be considered in two ways First we can consider it according to its proper notion and this is to consider it absolutely In this way nothing is true of the essence except what pertains to it absolutely thus everything else that may be attributed to it will be attributed falsely For example to man in that which he is a man pertains animal and rational and the other things that fall in his definition white or black or whatever else of this kind that is not in the notion of humanity does not pertain to man in that which he is a man Hence if it is asked whether this nature considered in this way can be said to be one or many we should concede neither alternative for both are beyond the concept of humanity and either may befall the conception of man If plurality were in the concept of this nature it could never be one but nevertheless it is one as it exists in Socrates Similarly if unity were in the notion of this nature then it would be one and the same in Socrates and Plato and it could not be made many in the many individuals Second we can also consider the existence the essence has in this thing or in that in this way something can be predicated of the essence accidentally by reason of what the essence is in as when we say that man is white because Socrates is white although this does not pertain to man in that which he is a man The nature considered in this way however has a double existence It exists in singulars on the one hand and in the soul on the other and from each of these there follow accidents In singulars furthermore the essence has a multiple existence according to the multiplicity of singulars Nevertheless if we consider the essence in the first or absolute sense none of these pertain to the essence For it is false to say that the essence of man considered absolutely has existence in this singular because if existence in this singular pertained to man insofar as he is man man would never exist outside this singular Similarly if it pertained to man insofar as he is man not to exist in this singular then the essence would never exist in the singular But it is true to say that man but not insofar as he is man has whatever may be in this singular or in that one or else in the soul Therefore the nature of man considered absolutely abstracts from every existence though it does not exclude the existence of anything either And the nature thus considered is the one predicated of each individual Nevertheless the nature understood in this way is not a universal notion because unity and commonality are in the notion of a universal and neither of these pertains to human nature considered absolutely For if commonality were in the concept of man then in whatever humanity were found there would be found commonality and this is false because no commonality is found in Socrates but rather whatever is in him is individuated Similarly the notion of genus or species does not pertain to human nature as an accident arising from the existence that the nature has in individuals for human nature is not found in individuals according to its unity such that it will be one thing in all the individuals which the notion of the universal demands The only possibility therefore is that the notion of species pertains to human nature according to the existence human nature has in the intellect Human nature has in the intellect existence abstracted from all individuals and thus it is related uniformly to all individuals that exist outside the soul as it is equally similar to all of them and it leads to knowledge of all insofar as they are men Since the nature in the intellect has this relation to each individual the intellect invents the notion of species and attributes it to itself Hence the Commentator in De Anima I com 8 says The intellect is what makes universality in things and Avicenna says the same in his Metaphysicae V cap 2 Although this nature understood in the intellect has the notion of a universal in relation to things outside the soul because it is one likeness of them all as the nature has existence in this intellect or in that one it is a certain particular understood species The Commentator therefore is in error in De Anima III com 5 when he wants to infer the unity of intellect in all men from the universality of the understood form because the universality of the form does not arise from the existence the form has in the intellect but rather from its relation to things as a likeness of such things It is as if there were a corporeal statue representing many men that image or species of statue would have a singular and proper existence insofar as it exists in this matter but it would have an aspect of commonality insofar as it was a common representative of many Since human nature considered absolutely is properly predicated of Socrates and since the notion of species does not pertain to human nature considered absolutely but only accidentally because of the existence the nature has in the intellect the term species is not predicated of Socrates for we do not say that Socrates is a species We would have to say that Socrates is a species if the notion of species pertained to man arising from the existence that the nature has in Socrates or from the nature considered absolutely that is insofar as man is man For whatever pertains to man insofar as he is man is predicated of Socrates But to be predicated pertains to a genus per se because being predicated is placed in its definition Now predication is completed by the action of the intellect in compounding and dividing and it has as its basis the unity of those things one of which is said of another Hence the notion of predicability can be subsumed in the notion of this intention that is the genus which is itself completed by an act of the intellect Still when the intellect attributes the intention of predicability to something by compounding it with another this intention is not that of genus it is rather that to which the intellect attributes the intention of genus as for instance to what is signified by the term animal We have thus made clear how the essence or nature is related to the notion of species for the notion of species is not among those that pertain to the essence considered absolutely nor is it among the accidents that follow from the existence that the essence has outside the soul as whiteness or blackness Rather the notion of species is among the accidents that follow from the existence the essence has in the intellect And in this way as well do the notions of genus or difference pertain to essences Chapter IV We should now see how essences exist in separated substances that is in the soul in the intelligences and in the first cause Now while everyone concedes the simplicity of the first cause some people have tried to introduce into the intelligences and the soul a composition of form and matter a position that seems to have begun with Avicebron the author of the book called Fons Vitae But this view is repugnant to the common teaching of the philosophers for they call these things substances separated from matter and they prove them to be wholly without matter The most cogent demonstration of this proceeds from the excellence of understanding found in these substances For we see that forms are not actually intelligible except as they are separated from matter and its conditions and forms are not made actually intelligible except by virtue of an intelligent substance which educes the forms and receives them in itself Hence in any intelligent substance there is a complete absence of matter in such a way that the substance has neither a material part itself nor even is the substance like a form impressed in matter as is the case with material forms Nor can someone say that only corporeal matter and not some other kind of matter impedes intelligibility For if it were only corporeal mater that impedes intelligibility then since matter is called corporeal only insofar as it exists under a corporeal form matter s impeding intelligibility would come from the corporeal form and this is impossible for the corporeal form is actually intelligible just like any other form insofar as it is abstracted from matter Hence in no way is there a composition of matter and form in either the soul or the intelligences such that an essence is received in these as in corporeal substances Nevertheless in separate substances there is a composition of form and existence and so in the Liber de Causis prop 9 com it is said that the intelligences have form and existence and in this place form is taken in the sense of a simple quiddity or nature It is easy to see how this is the case Whenever two things are related to each other such that one is the cause of the other the one that is the cause can have existence without the other but not conversely Now we find that matter and form are related in such a way that form gives existence to matter and therefore it is impossible that matter exist without a form but it is not impossible that a form exist without matter for a form insofar as it is a form is not dependent on matter When we find a form that cannot exist except in matter this happens because such forms are distant from the first principle which is primary and pure act Hence those forms that are nearest the first principle are subsisting forms essentially without matter for not the whole genus of forms requires matter as said above and the intelligences are forms of this type Thus the essences or quiddities of these substances are not other than the forms themselves Therefore the essence of a composite substance and that of a simple substance differ in that the essence of a composite substance is not form alone but embraces both form and matter while the essence of a simple substance is form alone And from this two other differences arise One is that the essence of a composite substance can be signified as a whole or as a part which happens because of the designation of the matter as said above Hence in one way the essence of a composite thing is not predicated of the composite thing itself for we cannot say that a man is his own quiddity But the essence of a simple thing which is its form cannot be signified except as a whole as in this case there is nothing beyond the form that might receive the quiddity and so however we take the essence of a simple thing the essence is predicated of it Hence Avicenna says in Metaphysicae V cap 5 that the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself because there is no other thing to receive the form The second difference is that the essences of composite things because they are received in designate matter are multiplied according to the division of matter and so it happens that some things are the same in species but different in number But since the essence of a simple thing is not received in matter there can be no such multiplication in this case and so among such substances we do not find many individuals of the same species as Avicenna expressly says in Metaphysicae V cap 2 Although substances of this kind are form alone and are without matter they are nevertheless not in every way simple and they are not pure act rather they have an admixture of potency and this can be seen as follows Whatever is not in the concept of the essence or the quiddity comes from beyond the essence and makes a composition with the essence because no essence can be understood without the things that are its parts But every essence or quiddity can be understood without understanding anything about its existence I can understand what a man is or what a phoenix is and nevertheless not know whether either has existence in reality Therefore it is clear that existence is something other than the essence or quiddity unless perhaps there is something whose quiddity is its very own existence and this thing must be one and primary For there can be no plurification of something except by the addition of some difference as the nature of a genus is multiplied in its species or as since the form is received in diverse matters the nature of the species is multiplied in diverse individuals or again as when one thing is absolute and another is received in something else as if there were a certain separate heat that was other than unseparated heat by reason of its own separation But if we posit a thing that is existence only such that it is subsisting existence itself this existence will not receive the addition of a difference for if there were added a difference there would be not only existence but existence and also beyond this some form much less would such a thing receive the addition of matter for then the thing would be not subsisting existence but material existence Hence it remains that a thing that is its own existence cannot be other than one and so in every other thing the thing s existence is one thing and its essence or quiddity or nature or form is another In the intelligences therefore there is existence beyond the form and so we say that an intelligence is form and existence Everything that pertains to a thing however either is caused by the principles of its own nature as risibility in man or else comes from some extrinsic principle as light in the air from the influence of the sun Now it cannot be that existence itself is caused by the very form or quiddity of the thing I mean as by an efficient cause because then the thing would be its own efficient cause and the thing would produce itself in existence which is impossible Therefore everything the existence of which is other than its own nature has existence from another And since everything that is through another is reduced to that which is through itself as to a first cause there is something that is the cause of existing in all things in that this thing is existence only Otherwise we would have to go to infinity in causes for everything that is not existence alone has a cause of its existence as said above It is clear therefore that the intelligences are form and existence and have existence from the first being which is existence alone and this is the first cause which is God Everything that receives something from another is in potency with respect to what it receives and that which is received in the thing is its act therefore a quiddity or form that is an intelligence is in potency with respect to the existence that it receives from God and this received existence is received as its act And thus there are found in the intelligences both potency and act but not matter and form unless in some equivocal sense So too to suffer to receive to be a subject and everything of this type that seem to pertain to things by reason of their matter are said of intellectual substances and corporeal substances equivocally as the Commentator says in De Anima III com 14 Furthermore since as said above the quiddity of an intelligence is the intelligence itself its quiddity or essence is itself the very thing that exists and its existence received from God is that by which it subsists in the nature of things and because of this some people say that substances of this kind are composed of what is and that by which it is or of what is and existence as Boethius says in De Hebdomadibus PL 64 1311 B C Moreover since we posit in the intelligences potency and act it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences which would be impossible if there were in them no potency Hence the Commentator says in De Anima III com 5 that if the nature of the possible intellect were unknown we would not be able to find a multitude of separate substances There is thus a distinction among separate substances according to their grade of potency and act such that the superior intelligences which are nearer the first cause have more act and less potency and so on This scale comes to an end with the human soul which holds the lowest place among intellectual substances The soul s possible intellect is related to intelligible forms just as prime matter which holds the lowest place in sensible existence is related to sensible forms as the Commentator says in De Anima III com 5 The Philosopher thus compares III De Anima cap 4 430a1 the soul to a tablet on which nothing has been written Since among intellectual substances the soul has the most potency it is so close to material things that a material thing is brought to participate in its existence that is from the soul and the body there results one existence in one composite thing although this existence as the existence of the soul is not dependent on the body Therefore beyond this form that is the soul there are other forms having more potency and being closer to matter and so much so that they have no existence without matter Among these forms there is an order and gradation down to the primary forms of the elements which are closest to matter and so these have no operation except as required by the active and passive qualities and other such qualities by which matter is disposed by form Chapter V Having treated these matters we can see clearly how essence is found in various kinds of things There are three ways in which substances may have an essence First surely is the way God has his essence which is his very existence itself and so we find certain philosophers saying that God does not have a quiddity or essence because his essence is not other than his existence From this it follows that he is not in a genus for everything that is in a genus has a quiddity beyond its existence since the quiddity or nature of the genus or species is not in the order of nature distinguished in the things of which it is the genus or species but the existence is diverse in diverse things Even though we say that God is existence alone we do not fall into the error of those who said that God is that universal existence by which everything formally exists The existence which is God is of such a kind that no addition can be made to it whence through its purity it is distinct from every other existence for this reason the author of the Liber de Causis prop 9 com says that the individuation of the first cause which is being alone is through its pure goodness But common existence just as it does not include in its concept any addition so too in its concept does it not exclude any addition for if such existence did in its concept exclude any addition nothing could be understood to exist in which there was added something beyond existence Similarly although God is existence alone the remaining perfections and nobilities are not lacking in him On the contrary he has all the perfections that exist in every genus and for this reason he is called perfect without qualification as the Philosopher V Metaphysicae cap 16 1021b30 33 and the Commentator Metaphysicae V com 21 each say But God has these perfections in a more excellent way than all other things have them because in him they are one while in other things they are diverse And this is because all these perfections pertain to God according to his simple existence just as if someone through one quality could effect the operations of all qualities such a person would have in that one quality all the qualities so too does God in his very existence have all the perfections In a second way essence is found in created intellectual substances in which existence is other than essence although in these substances the essence is without matter Hence their existence is not absolute but received and so finite and limited by the capacity of the receiving nature but their nature or quiddity is absolute and is not received in any matter Thus the author of the Liber de Causis prop 16 com says that intelligences are infinite in an inferior way and finite in a superior way they are finite with respect to their existence which they receive from something superior though they are not rendered finite in an inferior way because their forms are not limited to the capacity of some matter receiving them And thus among such substances we do not find a multitude of individuals in one species as said above except in the case of the human soul and there we do find a multitude of individuals in one species because of the body to which the soul is united Now the individuation of the soul depends on the body in an occasional manner as to its inception for the soul does not acquire for itself individual existence unless in the body of which it is the act But nevertheless if we subtract the body the individuation does not perish because since the soul was made the form of a given body the form has absolute existence from which it has acquired individuated existence and this existence always remains individuated And thus Avicenna says De Anima V cap 3 that the individuation of souls and their multiplication depend on the body for their beginning but not for their end Since in these substances the quiddity is not the same as existence these substances can be ordered in a predicament and for this reason we find among these things genera species and differences although their proper differences are hidden from us In sensible things even the essential differences are unknown to us and so they are signified through accidental differences that arise from the essential ones just as a cause is signified through its effect We take bipedality for example as the difference of man The proper accidents of immaterial substances however are unknown to us and thus we can signify their differences neither per se nor through their accidental differences We should note though that the genus and difference in immaterial substances are not taken in the same way as in sensible substances for in sensible substances the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing while the difference is taken from that which is formal in the thing Hence Avicenna says De Anima I cap 1 that in things composed of form and matter the form is its simple difference because the thing is constituted from it not however because the form is the difference but rather because it is the principle of the difference as Avicenna himself says in his Metaphysicae V cap 6 Further this difference is called a simple difference because it is taken from that which is a part of the quiddity of the thing namely from the form But since immaterial substances are simple quiddities in such substances the difference cannot be taken from that which is a part of the quiddity but only from the whole quiddity and so in De Anima I cap 1 Avicenna says that substances have no simple difference except for those species of which the essences are composed of matter and form Similarly in immaterial things the genus is taken from the whole essence though not in the same way as the difference is One separated substance is like another with respect to their immateriality but they differ one from another with respect to their grade of perfection according to how far each recedes from potentiality and approaches pure act And so in such substances the genus is taken from that which arises in these substances insofar as they are immaterial as intellectuality and such things the difference however is taken from that which arises in these

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/de_ente_et_essentia.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive

  • intermezzo
    Thomas was well aware of that Since this is only an intermezzo non latin readers can happily skip it or read the translation It s just so nice to experience the flavor of medieval thinking about the fascinating and all encompassing theory of Being Prologus Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine secundum Philosophum in I Caeli et mundi ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/classical_intermezzo.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Works of St Thomas
    the full titles I also give the standard abbreviations that are often used in the literature 1 De Ente et Essentia Latin text Leonina Edition Aquinas On Being and Essence English translation of 1 and Commentary by Bobik J University of Notre Dame Press 1970 2 Summa Theologica Latin text Marietti Edition S T Summa Theologiae Latin text English translation of 2 Blackfriars Edition 3 Summa Contra Gentiles Latin text

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/works.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive

  • Dialogue
    your students And that metaphysics concerned ALL things didn t it I have understood that in that treatise man only figures as an instance to be generalized because your knowledge of other things was still fragmentary in those days Even of man your knowledge was still insufficient or do I see it wrongly Th No you see it rightly But you cannot after all melt together Philosophy with Natural Science again after they have gone later on their own separate ways Philosophy wants to get some final insight into immaterial things like the human spirit It must however start such an undertaking with the investigation of material things that is what Aristotle made clear to me But in the long run we have only a minor interest in the material world Let it be treated by Natural Science there it is as it has turned out in later centuries in good hands And that harping upon the theory of evolution all the time I mean that theory of what is his name Sarwin has nothing to do with Philosophy anyhow You should not confuse different levels of contemplation with each other The theory of evolution does not say anything about Being as such Ah his name was Darwin not Sarwin I have seen that your Natural Science is now also meddling in the social and cultural development of man which it wants to explain by means of if I m correctly informed the theory of dynamical dissipative systems That is totally ridiculous How can these theories which are after all just physico mathematical theories explain the development of the Spirit which belongs to a totally different domain I also heard that you moderns try to recreate the human spirit in a mechanical way or how you call it to simulate This is preposterous it degrades human dignity J Yah maybe you re right maybe today we think in too simplistic a fashion by willing to explain everything from one and the same origin namely the natural what is that anyway implying that everything should have the same ontological status and by assuming that Natural Science can in principle explain everything and that it comprises everything except of course the first principles on which it is based I do however not agree with what you just said about a degradation of human dignity Now YOU are guilty of confusing disparate contemplation levels With respect to that other domain of which Philosophy treats I just now realize that your Substantial Form could have something to do with meaning and meaning is not to be found at the syntactic level which is the proper domain of Natural Science Can it nonetheless be investigated by the latter According to the American philosopher Peirce Natural Science possibly could do so as far as my information has it But in that case the meaning of meaning is weakened and loses thereby everything that is meaningfull for it Perhaps especially Philosophy is most suitable to investigate this

    Original URL path: http://www.metafysica.nl/dialog.html (2016-02-01)
    Open archived version from archive



  •